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Should growth in Japan surpass tentative forecasts for its first year, the turn of the 
millennium would mark the end of the most severe recession to be experienced by an 
industrial country since the 1950s (IMF, 1999, p.77). Although characterised by 
stagnation rather than by output contraction, her macroeconomic performance since 
1992 appears to challenge a key assumption in recent literature that aggregate 
outcomes may be explained by attempted optimisation at the individual level. A 
noteworthy and explicit response to this conflict between theory and recent 
experience has been to re-examine whether the insights of Keynes, especially his 
hypothesised ‘liquidity trap’, might be rendered compatible with modern theoretical 
sensibilities (Krugman, 1998). Despite Keynes’ own doubts as to its empirical 
relevance, his ‘limiting case’ is currently seen as having potential application to the 
analysis of deflation beyond the particular context of Japan (Keynes, 1936, p.207, 
Buiter and Panigirtzoglou, 1999). 
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the underlying weakness in aggregate 
expenditures, however, it is argued below that the liquidity trap diagnosis risks 
furthering the advocacy of policies that could prove damaging to recovery both in 
Japan and in the surrounding region. The perspective adopted arises from an 
alternative view of economic crises which also provided inspiration for the modern 
‘equilibrium’ models of the business cycle (Laidler, 1994). The theory developed 
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from elements of the ‘Austrian’ tradition by Friedrich Hayek was controversial from 
the outset and was to be eclipsed in practical terms by the writings of Keynes. 
Nevertheless, Hayek’s insistence that the analysis of recessions must begin with their 
origins in initial conditions of equilibrium has parallels in modern theoretical 
developments, as well as an immediate practical attraction in the present context 
(Hayek, 1935, p.34). 
While a liquidity trap may be compatible in principle with ‘optimising’ behaviour 
under recession conditions, there is little agreement as to why such a condition should 
have arisen in the first instance. Beyond its intrinsic interest a systematic explanation 
of the causes of the recession might provide insight into the appropriate design of 
remedial policies. The Austrian theory is therefore reviewed in summary below prior 
to the presentation in these terms of an interpretation of the Japanese recession. 
Finally, despite the ‘policy pessimism’ sometimes associated with Hayek’s theory, the 
subsequent discussion will suggest measures which, while consistent with the 
analysis, stand in contrast to the prevailing emphasis on aggressive demand-side 
expansion. 
Money, capital structure and the origins of recession: 
Hayek’s analysis of macroeconomic fluctuations was based on Böhm-Bawerk’s 
capital theory in which emphasis is placed on the time dimension of investment 
decisions. Capital investment here permits the use of more time consuming 
(‘roundabout’) production processes where the implied additional ‘waiting’ is 
rewarded by inherently higher productivity in terms of finished consumer goods. It 
was the converse of this argument, that a fall in interest rates generated by increased 
waiting (saving) would lead to a lengthening of production processes, that was   3
challenged in the course of the ‘reswitching’ controversy (Samuelson, 1966). 
Nevertheless, the framework is adopted here on the grounds that it may provide a 
reasonable interpretation of aggregate tendencies while also, through one of its 
distinguishing characteristics, drawing attention to a central aspect of the Japanese 
experience. 
With Keynesian analysis traditionally concerned to ensure by demand management 
the full employment of a given productive capacity, potential linkages between such 
policies and the evolution of structures of production were not a focus of attention. 
The contrasting preoccupation of the Austrian approach with connections between 
monetary and real sector developments also distinguishes it from the modern 
macroeconomic literature that its equilibrium perspective is thought to have 
encouraged (Hoover, 1988, p. 251). It therefore provides a distinctive basis for 
examining the Japanese case in which high rates of capital formation preceded 
economic crisis. 
The time aspect of investment is introduced by considering a ‘process of production’ 
of finished consumption goods in which quantities of ‘original means of production’ 
are employed in sequential stages of processing. Taking labour as the uniform 
‘original’ factor, a process of production in which equal quantities of labour are added 
successively to work on the intermediate output of the immediately preceding stage 
may be depicted as in Figure 1 below: 
FIGURE 1 
Adopting the further assumption that all outputs are measured in terms of labour units, 
the final quantity of consumption goods resulting from this process is depicted by the 
bold vertical line at T'. The position of this line on the horizontal axis indicates the   4
time taken to complete the process, while the height of the upward sloping 
‘investment function’ at any earlier time represents the total quantity of labour 
‘invested’ and absorbed in the accumulated intermediate output to that point (Hayek, 
op.cit. p.38-40). In order to compare outputs arising from time profiles of production 
differing from those in Figure 1, Hayek adds a value dimension to the earlier diagram 
and the resulting construction may be used to explain the key propositions linking 
financial variables to capital structure. With output values measured on the vertical 
axis, the earlier figure now forms the horizontal plane of the three dimensional system 
represented in Figure 2 (Hayek, 1934, p.214): 
FIGURE 2 
Ignoring initially the displaced construction around the dashed axes to the right of 
Figure 2, the schedule OL’ (from Figure 1) indicates that labour is added in uniform 
amounts at each stage of production until final output is achieved after a time interval 
0T’. Each unit of labour now has the same cost OW although the vertical rectangular 
surface 0WL’L’’ shows that these costs are not all incurred for the same length of 
time. Labour applied at the earliest stage (perhaps producing specialised tools that 
will be used up facilitating operations in the later stages) is shown at the left of the 
diagram to be invested for the longest interval OT’. Although under ‘stationary 
conditions’ (with each process operating continuously) streams of income from the 
continuous sales of finished goods will be flowing back in payment to labour 
employed in earlier stages, the ‘return’ to labour in the first stage must be regarded as 
subject to the maximum delay. At the margin, an extra unit devoted to ‘finishing 
touches’ (just before T’ near L’ on the diagram), will generate its return almost   5
immediately. By contrast, additional labour in the earliest stage will only receive the 
value of its extra product after the full production period. 
The need to apply a discounting procedure to future receipts implies that that part of 
the final product to be ‘attributed’ to labour employed in the earlier stages will have to 
grow at a rate sufficient to reward the (working) capital necessarily tied up in its 
employment. In the case of the earliest stage, the value T’’ at time T’, when 
discounted at the given interest rate, will yield the sum OW. The same argument in 
the subsequent stages generates the curve L’’T’’ with its declining height reflecting 
the declining interest costs of employing labour in later stages of the production 
process. Since all the labour employed in this process (T’L’) receives the same reward 
OW, the value of the finished product must both yield this wage bill and cover the 
accumulated interest cost. The highlighted section T’T’’L’’L’ therefore measures the 
value of the finished product produced after one complete production period with the 
central implication that the interest payments are funded entirely out of the greater 
productivity permitted by the ‘roundabout’ process of production. 
In order to highlight the implications of changing financial conditions for different 
production structures under this framework an extreme contrast is depicted in the 
displaced component of Figure 2. In this case, the production process requires all of 
the labour to be invested in a single stage of production for a time period 0T1 (which 
should be taken to be less than half the length of 0T’ in the main diagram). It is clear 
in this case that the major part of the value of final output (represented by the 
highlighted rectangle with height T1T1’) will be exhausted in payments to labour. If an 
initial equilibrium is now assumed in which both activities are (just) viable at the 
given interest rate the consequences of an arbitrary reduction in the rate are depicted   6
by the two lowered interest surfaces (indicated by small arrows). If the actual 
revenues generated by the two activities are unchanged, the effect of the fall in 
interest rates is to raise the profitability of the more roundabout technology. By 
contrast, it is equally clear that a fall in the real wage will have a greater positive 
impact on the realised profitability of the less roundabout process. 
While these conclusions could have been reached more conventionally, the Austrian 
focus on the allocation of resources to specific time profiles of production emphasises 
that commitments may be disrupted by subsequent monetary developments (Garrison, 
1994, pp.112-14). Such disruption, however produced, is likely to be more severe the 
more specific the forms of investment involved and it was in this context that Hayek’s 
theory of economic fluctuations was subject to early criticism. It is clear from the 
elements presented above that ‘investment’ here involves the provision of working (or 
circulating) capital necessary to support labour involved in time-consuming activities. 
To introduce fixed (durable) capital into this framework was to risk confounding 
stock with flow considerations (Garrison, ibid. p.114). 
In a subsequent development of the approach, however, Hayek demonstrated that a 
continuing stream of final output generated by prior investment in durable equipment 
could be seen as deriving from a notional time allocation of labour services of the 
type illustrated in Figure 2 (Hayek, 1934, op.cit.  pp. 218-20)
1. A decline in real 
interest rates would therefore stimulate the investment of ‘original’ resources in the 
production of more ‘roundabout’ fixed equipment (ibid. pp.224-5). Modern 
techniques of project appraisal readily confirm this aspect of Hayek’s reasoning 
(Steele, 1993, pp. 149-60). 
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Under the assumed conditions of full employment, such induced investment had to 
imply a temporary withdrawal of resources from the production of consumption 
goods. Whereas resources released from their production by prior saving could justify 
increased capital intensity, a shift could also be the temporary consequence of lower 
interest rates associated with a rise in credit to the business sector. In this case, 
however, the resource shift out of consumption goods production amounted to ‘forced 
saving’ (Hayek, 1935, op.cit. pp. 88-9). The eventual bidding up of (scarce) 
consumption goods prices would provoke a return of resources to less roundabout 
techniques capable of enhancing their provision in the near term. This was Hayek’s 
‘Ricardo Effect’ and transitional unemployment resulting from the earlier 
misallocation of specific investment resources would then be its almost inevitable 
consequence (ibid. pp. 92-5). 
Before offering an interpretation of the Japanese experience that incorporates a 
variant of the Ricardo Effect, two controversial elements of the Austrian tradition 
should be acknowledged. In contrast to more recent literature, the framework implies 
that monetary expansion is far from ‘neutral’ in its impact on real activity: the 
consequences must depend on the initial allocation of the associated credit expansion. 
Whereas lower interest rates on business loans would promote an emphasis on 
roundabout processes, Figure 2 also confirms that extra resources provided only for 
final consumption spending would have the opposite implication. At constant interest 
rates, an arbitrary rise in the price of final output relative to the given wage would 
boost the realised profitability of the single stage process by more than that involving 
the more prolonged gestation period. Policies of aggregate demand expansion may 
thus be constrained by a capital structure incompatible with the pattern of 
expenditures they would generate.   8
Underlying this non-neutrality is a second characteristic of the Austrian approach that 
places it at variance with recent conventions Rather than involving the efficient 
processing of all pertinent information, expectations appear in Hayek’s 
characterisation of the business cycle to be driven by recent price developments. The 
view that expectations were ‘elastic’ in this tradition was, indeed, made explicit at an 
early stage (Mises, 1943). Although the repetitive characteristics of business cycles 
might lead firms to change their behaviour, Mises concluded from their continuation 
that they had yet to do so. Whether or not this conclusion remains valid, abrupt 
changes in established macroeconomic policy settings could be sufficient to generate 
real sector disruption under either expectations perspective. In the case of Japan, the 
attempt to manage the international value of the Yen in the mid-1980s probably 
served to confirm an increasingly clear policy objective. The real appreciation of the 
currency against the $US from 1971 appears to have been a more or less explicit 
objective of American commercial diplomacy (McKinnon, Ohno and Shirono, 1999). 
Triggered by bilateral trade imbalances, these pressures were ultimately linked to 
Japan's’ ‘structurally’ high saving rates. Japanese business might reasonably (and, to 
date, correctly) have expected Yen appreciation to be a lasting consequence of the 
conflict. 
The Japanese experience after 1985: 
Reflecting its role in monetary policy setting, the interest rate data presented in Chart 
1 are accompanied by the value for the Yen-Dollar exchange rate (calibrated on the 
right hand axis) for the years since 1980. With 1980-81 marking peak nominal interest 
rates following the OPEC price increases at the turn of the decade, the lightly dashed 
trace reflects the subsequent irregularly declining trend of the US Federal Funds Rate.   9
With this rate chosen to reflect American monetary policy developments, the relative 
stability of the (policy determined) Japanese discount rate led to a narrowing of the 
gap between the two in the years to 1985. The ‘Plaza’ agreement of September, 
involving an understanding that official foreign exchange intervention would seek to 
drive down the value of the US currency, was clearly more successful in securing its 
objective than was the subsequent ‘Louvre’ accord to stabilise the $ exchange rates 
prevailing in early 1987. Nevertheless, some attempt to arrest the slide of the US 
currency is evident in relative short-term interest rate policies during 1987 and 1988. 
CHART 1 
The implication that Japanese monetary policy was seeking in these two years to 
suppress the continuing rise in the Yen is consistent with the more general 
observation that episodes of increased currency strength have been associated with 
subsequent monetary relaxation by the Bank of Japan (Ueda, 1999). For present 
purposes, it is the associated further decline in nominal borrowing costs (the lending 
rate) that should be emphasised. As US monetary policy acquired a counter 
inflationary stance between 1987 and 1989, however, the relative strengthening of the 
$ appears to have encouraged the Japanese authorities to tighten monetary conditions. 
The associated sharp rise in borrowing costs between 1989 and 1991 is evident from 
the Chart, as is the subsequent decline of both series as the recession gathered pace 
from 1992. 
Recognising that the earlier theoretical discussion was in terms of real interest rates, 
the demonstration that nominal borrowing costs were declining during the 1980s need 
not imply that the perceived real cost of loans was falling. While such a translation 
would require an index of inflation expectations, Chart 1 also reports a real lending   10
rate series representing the nominal rate discussed above with the contemporaneous 
inflation rate deducted. Real borrowing costs on this crude measure appear to have 
risen as inflation declined between 1980 and 1983. Subsequently, however, a 
downward trend is apparent with minimum real rates being indicated in 1989. With 
real borrowing costs falling as the authorities sought to contain a rising currency 
during the latter half of the 1980s, the earlier theoretical perspective would also draw 
attention to a further consequence of that appreciation. 
Although Yen-based wage indices for monthly earnings show modest rates of 
increase in Japan throughout the period, it was the behaviour of the real wage that was 
relevant to the choice of production structure. In this connection, at least in the 
internationally exposed sector, currency appreciation appears to have had major 
consequences. Relative unit labour costs reported by the OECD and plotted in Chart 2 
confirm the substantial impact arising from the strengthening of the Yen in the second 
half of the 1980s. The subsequent dependence of this measure on the behaviour of the 
exchange rate is shown in the ‘improvement’ in relative costs as the Yen weakened 
against the $ between 1988and 1990 and, again, in the deterioration implied by the 
currency’s growing strength through to 1995. 
CHART 2 
The theoretical implication that these relative factor cost developments would 
increase the degree of production ‘roundaboutness’ might be confirmed by a rising 
value for its natural empirical equivalent, the capital-output ratio (Blaug, 1968, 
pp.525-7). Unfortunately, in addition to the difficulties involved in measurement of 
the capital stock, its slow rate of turnover is likely to limit the ability of this measure 
to register the effects of policy developments over a small number of years. The 
contrasting weakness of the alternative (annual) ICOR calculation as a measure of   11
supply side developments, however, is that it is affected by the influence of 
fluctuations in aggregate demand on GDP. As an alternative indicator of changing 
capital intensity, therefore, a ‘synthetic’ incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) is 
displayed in Chart 2. 
In this measure, real non-residential private fixed capital formation is divided by the 
annual change in real GDP implied by the linear (logarithmic) trend of that variable 
between 1980 and 1997. Although crude, a justification for this procedure may be 
offered in the present context. Japanese GDP appears to have registered less than its 
underlying potential growth for most of the period 1982-87. By contrast the pre 
recession years 1988-92 were characterised by expansion exceeding sustainable 
values (Bayoumi, 1999, Chart 1). Assuming investment decisions to be based on a 
longer-term horizon, therefore, the annual ICOR would tend to overstate the 
underlying investment intensity of growth for the years 1982-87 and to underestimate 
it for the later period. The linear trend used here follows the potential path suggested 
by the IMF study for the years until 1992 and is therefore taken to proxy the evolution 
of aggregate supply capacity. Dominated by the flow of actual investment spending, 
therefore, this measure (on the right hand scale of Chart 2) suggests a marked increase 
in capital intensity beginning in 1989 and reaching a peak in the pre-recession year of 
1991. With the use of trend values for GDP, the equally striking decline in the ICOR 
measure from 1992 to 1994 reflects entirely the fall in actual investment spending 
which has been such a central aspect of the recession. 
Macroeconomic policy developments conducive to rising capital intensity having 
characterised the immediately preceding years, the initiation of recession in 1992 also 
appears to have involved monetary policy influences. The suggestion in Chart 1 that   12
financial conditions in Japan were becoming restrictive after 1988 appears to 
understate the shift in stance as measured by the more comprehensive OECD index of 
monetary conditions (OECD 1997, p.40). Against the background of a resumption of 
Yen appreciation against the $ after 1990 (Chart 1) it is clear from Chart 2 that the 
recession was associated with a sudden decline in the previously elevated level of 
investment spending. Moreover, as the data presented in Table 1 confirm, the focus of 
this decline appears to have been rather narrow. 
TABLE 1 
The table reports real GDP and fixed capital formation over the relevant period with, 
in each case, a narrowing focus on manufacturing and on the machinery and 
equipment sub-sector. While real GDP records minimal growth between 1991 and 
1994, the decline in manufacturing output is especially severe in 1993. Moreover the 
sub-sector ‘fabricated metals, machinery and equipment’ accounted for a half of the 
manufacturing reduction. While noting that this coincided with a fall in both export 
volume and in unit values, the role of declining investment spending is especially 
clear. The decline in fixed capital formation between 1991 and 1994 is more than 
accounted for by reduced outlays on machinery and equipment. Moreover the decline 
in these series preceded the sharp decline in export revenues witnessed in 1993. In 
summary, it appears that relative movements in capital and labour costs that had 
generated a boom in investment spending in the late 1980s were to be associated with 
a recession prolonged by the opposite behaviour of that magnitude during the early 
1990s. 
Interpretation of this development in terms of the theoretical perspective adopted here 
must rest on a reconsideration of the basis of the Ricardo Effect. Whereas the   13
economic boom might have been initiated by extra credits granted for investment 
purposes, at a later stage in the upswing it had been assumed by Hayek that product 
price increases would outpace wage increases thereby initiating a shift from more to 
less roundabout production structures (Dostaler, 1994, p.160). For given nominal 
wages and rental costs of capital, however, it had been objected on conventional 
grounds that a rise in final product prices should not be expected to produce a shift to 
more labour intensive processes. 
Profit maximisation would require that the ratio of the marginal physical products of 
any two factors of production would be the same as that of their marginal costs over 
the same time period. If the latter were no longer changing, the only effect of rising 
prices under assumptions of constant returns to scale would be to encourage a 
proportional increase in the employment of both factors. In his review of this 
controversy, Blaug argues that the Ricardo Effect might nevertheless be rationalised 
by the introduction of balance sheet constraints on firms’ investment spending. 
Moreover, this interpretation appears to have been consistent with Hayek’s own 
position (Blaug, 1968, p.546). 
Since firms typically supply some of their own finance in the form of equity capital, 
Kalecki’s ‘principle of increasing risk’ would suggest eventual reluctance to increase 
gearing in order to finance the acquisition of new equipment during later stages of the 
boom. Labour-using techniques might then be employed in order to economise on 
investment outlays, thereby validating the Ricardo Effect. However, as Blaug 
emphasises, the boom itself will permit increased profit retentions to shift the supply 
schedule of ‘own’ finance and thereby to enhance the capacity to carry debt. If, 
therefore, the Ricardo Effect requires the presence of balance sheet constraints, the   14
latter are likely to become determining factors in the recession when the stance of 
monetary policy eventually becomes restrictive (ibid. pp.547-8). 
This view of the Ricardo Effect suggests that a consistent explanation of the recession 
might be offered despite the absence of disruptive consumer goods price increases on 
which the Austrian model normally relies. Presumably reflecting the country’s high 
saving propensity, the inflationary pressures that were to trigger monetary policy 
tightening had been reflected in asset price escalation. Associated with low interest 
rates this development had earlier furnished an attractive financial context for fixed 
investment expenditures, and it is clear in retrospect that the opportunity was indulged 
to excess. One estimate at the close of the 1990s, for instance, indicated that the ratio 
of net business capital (stock) to potential output remained higher than its trend in the 
pre-recession years (IMF, 1999, p.95). 
As an initial index of the impact on business balance sheets of the shift to monetary 
restriction Table 2 reports OECD data on operating surpluses (value added after 
deduction of labour costs). Although the data are recorded in nominal values, an 
absolute decline in the operating surpluses of all industries (including agriculture and 
private services) is evident in the years following 1991. It is clear before consideration 
of the impact of higher interest rates, therefore, that business profitability was 
deteriorating markedly. As in Table 1, the initial series in Table 2 is supplemented by 
reference to more narrowly defined components. The first of these confirms that the 
declining surpluses are entirely accounted for by the manufacturing sector, with the 
sub-sector including machinery and equipment production accounting in turn for a 
major part of that negative contribution. 
TABLE 2   15
In addition to the underlying decline in surpluses accruing to the industrial sector, a 
rising commitment to interest payments may be inferred from the increase in business 
‘gearing’ evident over the period of Table 2. Restricting attention to the sum of long 
term loans and corporate bonds, the commitments of large manufacturing firms 
having represented 29.2% of shareholders’ capital in 1985 rose to a peak of 38.2% in 
1993. Small and medium manufacturing enterprises, having registered a ratio of 
56.8% in 1985, had debt commitments amounting to 105.6% of their ownership funds 
by 1996 (OECD, 1998, p.29). The exposure of owners to the financial risks arising 
from a combination of monetary tightening and declining profitability was, therefore, 
particularly evident for this category of firms. In accentuated form, the same risks had 
arisen in the construction and real estate sectors (ibid). 
The implication that monetary tightening, leveraged through ownership risk, triggered 
the recession by depressing investment spending reflects the more general observation 
that capital formation in Japan is strongly correlated with the margin between the rate 
of return on physical assets and long term interest rates (eg. OECD, 1997 p19). To 
explain the exceptional nature of the recent experience, therefore, the modified 
‘Austrian’ perspective would emphasise the structural and financial consequences of 
low interest rates, and an appreciating Yen, during the preceding investment boom. 
This focus on international cost comparisons as an explanation clearly differs from the 
accepted view that the Japanese economy is relatively ‘closed’: exports accounted for 
only 12.4% of manufacturing production between 1985 and 1990 compared, for 
instance, with 27% for four large European economies (OECD, 1993, p.68). 
Since it is to the demand contribution of exports that attention is drawn by this 
observation, the impression given must be qualified. If export dependence is low, this   16
is also the case for the import ‘leakage’. Whereas the four European economies 
depended for almost 26% of their ‘apparent consumption’
2 of manufactured goods on 
imported supplies, the figure for Japan was 5.4% (ibid). Moreover, an indirect 
demand contribution of exports should also be recognised. With GFCF accounting for 
approximately 30% of GDP in the late 1980s, this component accounted for much of 
the growth in domestic demand in the pre-recession years. To varying degrees, these 
expenditures would be motivated by plans connected with exports. As a supply-side 
perspective would emphasise, both home and export sales generally derive from the 
same production facilities and, if firms wish to maintain export competitiveness in the 
presence of changing conditions, production structures throughout the ‘tradeables’ 
sector are likely to be affected. 
To these domestic implications of changing external cost conditions should be added 
their consequences for the country’s international investment flows. Beyond the 
import substituting manufacturing plants increasingly established in the key markets 
of North America and Europe, a major development occurred from the mid 1980s. 
The Yen-driven increase in relative labour costs also provoked the relocation of the 
less capital (and skill) intensive activities to the surrounding region. Directed by 
Japanese multinational enterprises, this process was to achieve macroeconomic 
significance. 
By 1996, total employment in all overseas plants exceeded 2 million, a figure 
equivalent to 15.4% of domestic employment (OECD 1998, p.30). Over two hundred 
thousand work places were lost between 1991 and 1994 in the ten manufacturing sub-
sectors thought to have been the most vulnerable to cost based relocation (ibid. 
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p.159). Together with the induced dislocation in the domestic supply chain, this was 
the ‘hollowing out’ phenomenon that accounted for at least some of the weakness in 
domestic manufacturing investment (especially by small firm ‘clusters’) during the 
1990s. Moreover, while the early stages of the process to 1992 had been expansionary 
on the demand side, with exports of machinery for the new installations more than 
offsetting declining exports of finished goods, the impact had become unambiguously 
negative by 1996 (ibid. p.27). If this production re-location illustrates the ability of 
macroeconomic policies to effect inadvertent structural change, action in the short-
term should both recognise the developments in the real sector that have already 
occurred and seek consistency with those more distant developments implied by 
underlying characteristics of the economy. 
A policy reassessment of the liquidity trap: 
Faced with severe unemployment during the 1930s, the structural focus of the 
Austrian diagnosis suggested a ‘policy pessimism’ that may have accounted for its 
subsequent lack of practical influence (Laidler, op.cit.  pp.16-18). With proposed 
responses to the Japanese recession once more emphasising demand stimuli it is clear 
that this objection has been little weakened by the disappointing results to date from 
the numerous fiscal and monetary measures already implemented. The consensus 
view appears to be that the policies have had little effect because they have not been 
pursued with sufficient vigour (eg. Posen, 1998). 
Expressing doubt that a single fiscal injection could suffice, Krugman emphasises the 
need for sustained monetary expansion (op. cit.). Having demonstrated that a liquidity 
trap may be consistent with (attempted) inter-temporal optimisation, he argues that 
recovery requires a negative real interest rate to provoke a switch from future to   18
present consumption expenditures. While acknowledging that low rates of capital 
formation have been central to recent demand weakness, he appears to view excessive 
saving as the key problem (Table 5, p.172). To secure negative real interest rates with 
nominal rates approaching zero, his proposed solution would involve a commitment 
on the part of the Bank of Japan to pursue an announced policy of (moderate) 
inflation over the long term. 
Assuming that such a commitment could be made credible, an immediate objection to 
this proposal would be that the relative price changes produced would be 
incompatible with the structural developments emphasised by the Austrian argument. 
As Krugman recognises, the policy would have the same exchange rate consequences 
as a monetary expansion under more conventional conditions, with the implication 
that a part of the demand expansion would be in the form of exports induced by Yen 
depreciation. The earlier theoretical discussion would suggest that this increase in the 
relative price of final output would shorten production processes and a practical 
instance is readily envisaged. A sustained depreciation of the currency would 
undermine the continued export of labour intensive processes to the surrounding 
region and could, in some cases, promote their repatriation. Introduced as a short-term 
expedient, the policy would more generally entail supply-side developments 
incompatible with Japan’s traditional saving surpluses. 
Although he does not discuss structural consequences, Krugman anticipates the more 
conventional objection that his proposal would amount to a “beggar-thy-neighbour” 
policy. He derives from his inter-temporal framework a coefficient defined by this 
term and, after inserting representative values, concludes that the concern would be 
largely misplaced. It is clear, however, that his coefficient bears little relation to the   19
policy as normally understood: the use of depreciation to gain external market share 
under conditions of imperfect competition. In his consumption optimisation model, by 
contrast, traded goods comprise a fixed endowment. The only impact on the foreign 
sector arises if domestic consumption switches towards non-tradeables when, in the 
presence of domestic price stickiness, monetary expansion permits an expanded 
supply (Appendix B, pp.185-7). 
Drawing on a range of econometric models, a more conventional argument is 
deployed to counter the trade friction concern. Estimated for the USA monetary 
expansion yields ‘substantial’ impacts on the exchange rate but with negligible 
consequences for the current account (Table 1, p.163). Thus, although export 
competitiveness is stimulated, the associated income multiplier effects lead to 
enhanced import demand. Although also a ‘large economy with fairly small trade 
shares’ the relevance of these findings to the Japanese case must be questioned. As a 
fraction of total domestic demand for manufactures (‘apparent consumption’) imports 
averaged a little over 13% for the USA between 1985 and 1990 against 5.4% for 
Japan: stimulation of US demand through monetary expansion would therefore 
provide relatively greater benefit to her trade partners. Moreover, those foreign 
industries experiencing increased US competition through $ depreciation would also 
be more likely to be the beneficiaries of expanded US demand. At 40% the intra-
industry trade ratio for US manufacturing over the same period was almost twice as 
large as the measure for Japan. At that time, five sectors accounted for 90% of Japan’s 
bilateral trade surplus with the larger economy (OECD, 1993, p. 68). 
A recent CGE modelling approach appears to underline this concern. Reflecting 
aggressive monetary expansion, the simulated effect of a 30% real depreciation of the   20
Yen is associated with an 8% fall in the US output of both motor vehicles and 
machinery (Noland, Robinson and Wang, 1998). The bilateral trade deficit in vehicles 
and parts increases by $22 billion and that for machinery by $16 billion, despite a 
significant improvement in Japanese economic activity. Trade frictions would 
presumably frustrate bilateral adjustments on this scale and an alternative response to 
the problem of the liquidity trap might therefore be considered. 
Although not immediately connected, an approach consistent with the earlier 
perspective is suggested by Hayek’s own early objections to flexible exchange rates 
(Hayek, 1939, pp. 63-4). Discussing the potential instability inherent in a fractional 
reserve banking system dependent for ultimate liquidity on a national central bank 
(itself holding limited foreign exchange reserves), he offers an opinion that bears 
directly on the liquidity trap diagnosis: 
“---- in consequence of the particular organisation of our credit structure, changes in 
liquidity preference as between different kinds of money are probably a much more 
potent cause of disturbances than the changes in the preference for holding money in 
general and holding goods in general which have played such a great role in recent 
refinements of theory” (ibid. p.80, italics in original) 
Directly applicable to the potential for severe credit contraction when central banks 
are obliged to respond to reserve losses under a fixed exchange rate regime, it is 
equally clear that Hayek did not regard floating rates as a satisfactory solution: 
“Every suspicion that exchange rates were likely to change in the near future would 
create an additional powerful motive for shifting funds from the country whose 
currency was likely to fall ---” (ibid. p.64).   21
Recognising that shifts between domestic and foreign monetary claims may generate 
disturbances under either regime, Hayek’s (then) preferred solution of a rigid gold 
standard backed by international reserves sufficient to avoid the need for excessive 
fluctuations in domestic credit hardly appears practical. One recent proposal, 
however, could offer a parallel mechanism for stabilising expectations and assuring 
their compatibility with policy objectives. Stressing political economy factors in the 
Yen’s secular strengthening against the $ since 1971, and as suggested above in 
connection with business investment expenditures, McKinnon argues that this trend 
subsequently became embedded in market expectations. Accordingly, as US interest 
rates declined with that country’s inflation in the 1990s, comparable Japanese rates 
were forced towards zero: the uncovered interest parity condition effectively imposed 
a ‘liquidity trap’ (McKinnon, 1999). 
Rather than attempting to influence inflation expectations, McKinnon proposes a joint 
commitment by the American and Japanese authorities to influence those concerning 
the Yen-$ rate. With the background assumption that US inflation would be held at 
low levels, he proposes agreement on a target forward exchange rate. Without initially 
attempting to enforce that rate, official interventions would seek to prompt the market 
rate in the appropriate direction. As a long run commitment by the authorities, 
expectations might begin to coalesce around the target value rather than continuing to 
project the customary Yen appreciation. Although international interest parity 
conditions would then force Japanese rates to rise towards those prevailing in the 
USA, this nominal increase would not transfer to anticipated real interest rates: 
inflation expectations would gradually be replacing expectations of deflation. With 
the latter depressing consumption and investment expenditures, an improvement in 
aggregate domestic demand would be implied. Nevertheless, a potential difficulty   22
with this strategy is emphasised by McKinnon. The rise in nominal rates implied by 
credibility of the exchange rate target could exacerbate in the short term the current 
balance sheet weakness of domestic debtors. 
A partial solution to this dilemma might be suggested in the distinction between a PPP 
based exchange rate target (between ¥120 and ¥130), as assumed by McKinnon, and 
an alternative based on medium-run calculations. The real exchange rate compatible 
with a sustainable current account balance has recently been estimated and implies a 
substantially more appreciated range for the Yen of between ¥77 and ¥95 (Institute 
for International Economics, 1998). While there are considerable uncertainties 
surrounding such calculations, the earlier discussion of the structural changes effected 
by the currency’s past strength suggests a lack of need for significant depreciation 
over the medium term. Assuming that a nominal target of (say) ¥110 gained 
credibility over a period of two years, with the implied inflation convergence, an 
initial ‘over’ depreciation of 10% towards the approximate values in McKinnon’s 
proposal would be consistent with the temporary maintenance of recent annual 
interest differentials (approximately 5½%). 
The distinction between this proposal and the variant advanced by Krugman is that 
the latter seeks to achieve a fall in real interest rates by the adoption of an explicit 
inflation target while leaving the exchange rate to find its own level. The alternative 
approach specifies an exchange rate target with the implication that inflation would 
begin to reflect that of Japan’s major trading partner. It will be argued below that a 
‘credible’ target for the future exchange rate could permit an equivalent reduction in 
real interest rates to be achieved with a significantly smaller initial depreciation of the 
Yen than would be likely under the inflation target strategy. A further potential   23
advantage of McKinnon’s approach may be that although non-sterilised exchange 
interventions would be required to establish the target, the purpose and eventual limits 
of these actions would be clear. Moreover, as the target became the focus for 
expectations, the need for the interventions would decline. The alternative 
requirement that the Bank of Japan should promote inflation actively over a period of 
years would be more likely to be resisted on institutional grounds (eg. Okina, 1999). 
Conclusions on structural aspects of the recession: 
The requirement to achieve an immediate reduction in real interest rates arises from 
the current depressed state of investment intentions in an economy characterised by 
high saving. Interpretation of such ‘IS’ weakness from the present perspective would 
emphasise the earlier commitment to capital intensive installations that, subsequently, 
have not been employed to capacity. Even in the absence of excess capacity, and in 
the anticipation of acceptable returns, balance sheet constraints may act to retard 
further capital expenditures. From this perspective, an inflation target policy could be 
seen as having two roles: induced currency depreciation would raise export 
profitability as inflation eroded existing indebtedness. Recognising these rather 
transparent objectives, however, the question arises as to whether financial asset 
holders would not respond defensively. If nominal interest rates remained low, the 
potential depreciation of the Yen could be much larger than PPP calculations would 
suggest. With little to guarantee that the inflation target would represent a ceiling as 
well as a floor, the earlier noted tendency for exchange rate expectations to be 
‘elastic’ in the face of policy uncertainty could produce excessive currency weakness. 
An anticipated advantage of the alternative exchange rate target approach would 
therefore be in terms of international political economy. In return for the co-operation   24
necessary for the policy’s success, the US authorities would gain by avoiding the need 
for an excessive burden of the adjustment to fall on a restricted range of American 
industries. In addition, the implication that a smaller part of the recovery would be 
derived from export expansion suggests that the Japanese authorities would be 
required to promote new domestic activities. With continued high saving, expanded 
investment spending would be essential and existing constraints in this connection 
suggest that much of the expansion would have to be in new enterprises. 
A recent review of applied studies has suggested that the potential output gains to be 
realised from structural reforms could be substantial (Oishi and Towe, 1998). 
Unusually wide variation in sectoral labour productivity measures is observed, for 
example, when Japan is compared with other industrial economies (OECD, 1998, 
p.156). Unfortunately, the short-term consequences of reform policies generally 
include increased unemployment and it has been suggested on these grounds that they 
cannot form part of an immediate strategy for recovery (Posen, op.cit). Against this 
position may be noted the continuing pressures, justified or not, from trade partners 
and the probable necessity for such a commitment in return for US co-operation in 
establishing an exchange rate target regime. One possible approach would include a 
phased introduction of market reforms together with a temporary investment tax 
credit
3. In anticipation of a more open market environment, an inducement of this 
type would be likely to stimulate the commitment to preparatory investment spending 
in a wide variety of sectors. While this spending would be welcome for its immediate 
employment implications, it would also be consistent with the achievement of 
desirable structural change. 
                                                 
3 Krugman also advocates this measure.   25
Similarly, if high aggregate saving is to continue to characterise Japan, an 
increasingly firm exchange rate commitment (given consistent policy settings in the 
two economies) could support the sustained outflows that limits to domestic 
investment opportunities would still require. A partial response might also have been 
found to Hayek’s early expression of concern over the potential for dislocation 
inherent in volatile international asset preferences. It is not clear that subsequent 
experience in Japan and elsewhere has undermined the case for such a response. 
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Billions of Yen. All data in 1990 
prices 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Real GDP  342950 352880 367556 390325  409184 429986 4463
Manufacturing  95718 94230 98613 106506 113490 121219 1275
Fabricated metals, machinery 
& equipment 
38321 39195 40953 46563 51322 56470 617
Gross Fixed Capital Formation   91322 95707 104453 116428  126006 136685 1411
Machinery & equipment  27527 28282 30246 35781 40142 44553 4612
 
Source: OECD National Accounts Volume 2 (1998) 







TABLE 2: OPERATING SURPLUS IN INDUSTRY AND MANUFACTURING 
 
Billions of Yen (Current Prices)  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Operating surplus 
(All industries & pvt. services ) 
96274 100070 104948 113693 121970 128598 1336
Manufacturing  24561 23329 23778 26530 27879 29125 3022
Fabricated metals, machinery 
& equipment 
9940 8140 7861 9872 11567 12610 127
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